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Peer Production of Survivable Critical Infrastructures 
 
Yochai Benkler* 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper describes an approach to provisioning survivable critical communications and 
computation infrastructures by deploying radically distributed, peer-based systems for 
communication, computation, and data storage and retrieval.  The paper focuses on 
system survivability as an approach to robustness, rather than on artifact-oriented 
hardness or impregnability.  Based on a survey of experience with ad hoc wireless mesh 
networks, peer-to-peer storage and retrieval systems, and distributed computing, the 
paper identifies a class of solutions that mobilize redundant capacity resident in privately 
owned, extant unlicensed wireless devices, desktops, laptops, and handhelds around the 
periphery of the network to provide redundant, adaptive, self-healing systems.  The paper 
explains how the disparate network-based practices we observe today can be understood 
as embodying a common production modality.  It explains why individuals systematically 
invest in goods that have excess capacity relative to their needs, and why these goods 
might more effectively be harnessed through social relations-based sharing and exchange 
practices, rather than through either a price system or managerial/administrative 
direction.  The paper concludes with some observations on how organizations or 
government agencies can act to implement such peer-based survivable systems using the 
excess capacity extant in the organization, or in society, respectively.   
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Imagine a data storage and retrieval system that stores millions of discrete files, in 
a way that can be accessed, searched and retrieved by millions of users, who can access 
the system wherever they are connected to the Internet.  Imagine that this system is under 
a multi-pronged attack.  Its enemies have used a variety of techniques, ranging from 
shutting down the main search server under the threat of armed seizure, to inserting 
malicious files to corrupt the system, to capturing and threatening the operators of storage 
devices.  Imagine that even through all these assaults, the system continues to operate, 
and continues to provide high quality storage, search, and retrieval functionality to 
millions of users worldwide.  That would be a system worth studying as a model for 
cybersecurity, would it not?   
 
That system has in fact been in existence for five years, and it has indeed been 
under the kinds of attacks described over this entire period.  It is the peer-to-peer music 
file sharing system.  It is the epitome of a survivable system.  Its primary design 
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characteristic is radically distributed redundant capacity.  The primary economic puzzles 
in understanding whether it is a model that can be harnessed to design survivable systems 
more generally are: (1) why there is so much excess capacity for its core components—
storage, processing, and communications capacity, in the hands of many widely 
distributed users; and (2) how one might replicate it for uses that are somewhat less 
controversial than sharing music files.   
 
 Peer-to-peer file sharing networks are but one, highly visible, example of a much 
broader phenomenon in present computation and communications systems.  Shareable 
goods—goods that have excess capacity and are widely distributed throughout the 
economy in the hands of many users—are widespread in the digitally networked 
environment.  Personal computers and handhelds; wireless transceivers; DVRs, 
microwave ovens, and many other devices have excess capacity of one or more of the 
following basic functionalities—computation, storage, and communications capacity.  
These goods are widely distributed and diversely located both geographically and in 
network topology.  Their excess capacity and topological diversity can, with the right 
network design, be used to render their excess capacity available as redundant capacity 
that is highly survivable in case of attacks in either physical or network space.   
 
 The paper begins with a very brief definition of survivability and how it differs 
from hardening or impregnability as an approach to security.  I then consider three areas 
of focus  in which we already see sharing networks that provision the three primary 
functionalities of communications and computation infrastructures—computation, 
communications, and storage—on a radically distributed, peer-production model.  All 
these systems share three characteristics that make them highly attractive from a 
survivability perspective.  They all have (a) redundant capacity; that is (b) geographically 
and topologically diverse; and are (c) capable of self-organization and self-healing on a 
fully distributed model, without need for reference to any single point of organization that 
can, in turn, become a single point of failure.  How do these networks of redundant 
capacity arise?  Why is the excess capacity provisioned in the first place, and how is it 
then harnessed?  The answer described in Part III is that the case studies represent 
specific instantiations of a general category of economic production—social sharing and 
exchange—that harnesses the excess capacity of a particular type of goods—shareable 
goods.  The characteristics of shareable goods make them widely distributed in the 
population (at least of relatively wealthy nations), and hence available for the creation of 
survivable systems.  The characteristics of shareable goods generally well-describe most, 
if not all, communication and computation devices presently deployed and planned.  In 
other words, the universe of end user computation and communication equipment 
systematically includes the excess capacity necessary to produce the kinds of survivable 
systems that the case studies suggest.  These can be harnessed in a variety of ways, 
ranging from managerially-mandated sharing of excess capacity in large-scale enterprises 
or networks for pooling redundant capacity among smaller enterprises, through secondary 
markets, and all the way to sharing models—like peer-to-peer filing sharing networks or 
ad hoc mesh wireless networks.  But for reasons to do with transactions costs and the 
diversity of motivations of the owners of the resources, social sharing and exchange has 
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distinct advantages over secondary markets in pooling resources not already owned by a 
single enterprise.  
 
It is the opportunity for social sharing that offers the most interesting policy 
implications.  If indeed we live under technical-market conditions that lead to many 
individuals in society owning large quantities of excess capacity of all three core 
functionalities in communications and information systems, what can policy do to 
facilitate their joining sharing networks that could eventually provide a valuable source of 
survivability to the digitally networked environment?  One approach whose effects would 
mostly be felt in wireless carriage and storage and retrieval systems is adjusting the 
laws—like spectrum regulation—that have been hampering growth and adoption of 
sharing-capable systems.  Another approach may be a quid pro quo, whereby the sharing 
networks receive some form of regulatory relief in exchange for making their capacity 
available for an emergency system.  This might include, for example, permitting use of 
frequencies normally allocated to public use for unlicensed wireless devices that use ad 
hoc mesh architectures, in exchange for utilizing protocols that would recognize public 
use, on a “sirens and lights” model, and hand over their excess capacity to aid public 
safety in an emergency.  It might take the form of a more explicit safe harbor for peer-to-
peer sharing networks if their design makes them available to use incrementally for 
survivable data storage and retrieval systems.  The last part of the paper explores these 
options. 
 
 The basic point of the paper is simple.  We live in a technological context in 
which a tremendous amount of excess capacity of the basic building blocks of our 
information and communications infrastructure is widely deployed.  The widely 
distributed and topologically diverse deployment of these resources make them ideally 
suited for building redundant, survivable backup systems for our basic computation and 
communications infrastructure.  Harnessing this excess capacity to create such a 
survivable infrastructure will likely be done most effectively not through improving the 
ability to price these resources, but through improving the conditions for social sharing 
and exchange of the excess capacity users own.  If we invest our policy efforts in 
hardening our systems to attack instead of rendering them survivable; if we ignore in our 
institutional design choices the effects of policy choices on social sharing and exchange, 
focusing solely on their effect on price-based markets and in enterprise organization, we 
will lose a significant opportunity to improve the survivability of our information systems 
at relatively low cost and with minimal bureaucratic intervention. 
 
II.   Survivable systems versus impregnable artifacts 
 
In 69 A.D., facing a siege by the Roman legions led by Vespesian, two groups of 
Jews in Jerusalem took two radically different approaches towards defending Jewish life 
and praxis.  The zealots, headed by Shimon Bar Giora and Yochanan of Gush Chalav 
fortified the citadel and the Temple.   Rabban Yochanan Ben-Zakai, on the other hand, 
appealed to Vespesian to allow him, and other rabbis who wanted to join him, safe 
passage to Yavneh—an unfortified area of no strategic or spiritual consequence—to set 
up a center for rabbinic study.  Vespesian agreed, hoping, no doubt, to win “hearts and 
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minds.”  The results of these choices are well known.  The zealots burned down with 
their temple and citadel, bringing an end to ten centuries of Temple-centric Jewish life.  
Ben-Zakai began the rabbinic tradition that allowed Jewish belief and praxis to evolve 
and adapt to changing conditions in the face of repeated destruction of one major center 
after another—from Babylon to Alexandria, from Spain to Poland and Lithuania.    
 
 The story encapsulates two basic models of attaining security.  One model is the 
survivable system model.  The other is the hardened or impregnable artifact.  System 
survivability as a concept for communications infrastructures has been around at least 
since Paul Baran’s germinal 1964 memorandum, On Distributed Communications.1  Its 
core parameters already then were understood to be distributed redundant capacity that 
can learn about system condition and adapt in real time to changing requirements and 
available resources.  It presaged the core characteristics of the Internet as a survivable 
system.  What it means for a system to be “survivable” is that it is capable of fulfilling its 
mission in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.2  The 
emphasis is not on repelling or preventing any attack or failure, the goal is to prevent 
such events from causing the system to fail to perform its mission.  What it means for an 
asset or artifact to be impregnable, on the other hand, is that it is hard enough to break 
that it will not be broken or compromised for as long as it is relevant that it not be broken. 
 
Redundancy, adaptability, and recombination are core properties of survivability 
defined in terms of a system.  It is how cultures store knowledge.  Durability, 
imperviousness, and retrieval are the core properties of an impregnable artifact.  It is how 
buried time capsules preserve knowledge.  Since survivability is in the system, not in any 
given artifact, it uses redundancy instead of durability to assure that any given 
functionality that the artifact could have is available from any artifact or relationship of 
artifacts usable for the functionality, rather than the durability of a particular 
functionality-producing artifact.  It uses adaptability to respond to environmental changes 
and challenges to minimize stress on, or loss of, the system, rather than building 
imperviousness into the artifact to assure that it is not compromised by changes.  And it 
uses recombination of capacities from the system, rather than retrieval of the uniquely 
durable and impervious artifact, to provide its functionality.   
 
Whether a given asset requires survivability or impregnability depends on the user 
and the use that make the asset valuable.  If the asset is valuable because of the use 
functionality it makes possible for its owner, then survivability is more important than 
impregnability.  What is valuable to the user is that the asset continue to be usable by the 
user, even under attack, not that it be untouched by another.  If the asset is valuable 
because it is unavailable for use by another, impregnability, rather than survivability, is 
genuinely necessary.  Many assets have aspects of both, and the relative importance of 
survivability or impregnability will depend on the relative value of both—a comparison 
that would only be useful to engage in if one had to make tradeoffs between what 
survivability required and what impregnability required.   
                                                 
1 RAND RM-3420-PR (AUGUST 1964), available http://www.rand.org/publications/RM/RM3420/. 
2 R.J. Ellison et. al., Survivable Network Systems, An Emerging Approach (November 1997), CMU-SEI 
Technical Report CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, available http://www.cert.org/research/97tr013.pdf. 
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Consider a customer database in the hands of three different types of companies.  
Company A is a customer-oriented company.  Its market position is widely understood as 
stemming from its responsiveness to customers, which combines excellent data on history 
of past purchases with a heavy emphasis on personal responsibility of each customer care 
agent for the entire pre- and post-purchase customer experience.  Company B is a 
transactional data collection and sales company.  Its business is built around an algorithm 
that, based on past purchase decisions allows it to predict within 75 microseconds of a 
user’s browser identifying itself to the website what products, out of a lineup of products 
any given web-based merchant offers, are most likely to capture the attention and money 
of that particular customer, and then displaying those items to that user.  Company C sells 
mailing lists to bulk mail advertisers.  Clearly Company C needs strictly to exclude 
competitors from its customer database, because if they extracted the information, they 
could simply directly replicate its product.  The same cannot be said about either 
Company A or B.  Each company has another major input into the mix that gives it a 
market advantage.  For each, if competitors got the contents of the customer information 
database, its operations would be little affected, and its competitiveness would also likely 
be little affected, unless the competitor successfully replicated either the customer-care 
staff or the algorithm, respectively.  For each, on the other hand, denial of access or loss 
of, say, 30% of the data in the database would be entirely disruptive, because it would 
disable the leveraging of the human or algorithm advantage in 30% of cases, undermining 
the reputation of the firm.  Companies A and B are, then, much more reliant upon the 
survivability of their database than upon its impregnability, while the inverse is true of 
Company C.   Company B, in turn, is more dependant on the impregnability of its 
algorithm, because that, if taken by another, can lead to matched competition, whereas 
Company A’s core advantage is outside any of its information systems exclusive features.  
As long as the system is up and running timely, that firm’s advantage—human 
connection relying on the information flow from the system—is unaffected. 
 
While the Internet as a whole functions on a distributed, redundant, self-
configuring and self-healing model that results in enormous survivability, not all points 
or functionalities in the digital environment are similarly designed.  Most processing that 
is directly relevant to users of any type occurs in discrete processors—personal 
computers, servers, etc.  Most storage happens in discrete storage media—hard drives, 
CDs, tapes, etc.  Most last/first mile physical links occur over single, non-redundant or at 
least low-redundancy links—such as a single cable into a home or small office, and 
sometimes no more than one or two major cables into a corporate campus.  While a 
redundant survivable system approach is used to preserve the flow of packets once in the 
Internet cloud, then, computation, storage, and even physical links from the user into that 
cloud are not designed in the same way.  They are, instead, usually designed on an 
impregnable artifact model—typified by the firewall, the password, and the locked office 
door.  These are all artifact-oriented hardening strategies.  They are not survivability 
strategies.  Given enough time, and given interconnected, unbounded networks whose 
very purpose is to reach across organizational domains and entity-boundaries—individual 
or corporate—hardening to the point of perfect success is quite possibly unattainable.  
Given that survivability is the primary value to at least some substantial subset of users of 
6 
 
computation and communications networks, the remainder of this paper asks whether 
there are approaches to replicating the redundant, distributed, self-healing architecture of 
the Internet for functionalities other than long-distance packet forwarding—specifically, 
for physical link capacity in the first mile, for data storage and retrieval systems, and for 
raw computation. 
 
III. Examples of peer-produced capacity-generating systems 
 
1. Ad hoc mesh wireless networks 
 
In the days following September 11, 2001, a group of volunteers delivered 
broadband connectivity to downtown Manhattan by setting up three WiFi hotspots.3  The 
group, NYC Wireless, had been engaged in a number of experiments throughout the city 
of placing open WiFi gateways to allow users to connect freely to the Internet.  When 
major infrastructure-based systems were down, connectivity was rapidly deployed, using 
unlicensed spectrum, not public safety spectrum, and off-the-shelf commercial 
equipment, not dedicated public safety equipment.  The story provides a primitive 
motivator to look at other, more sophisticated systems that would not similarly require 
volunteers to come and set up connectivity. Two elements of currently developed systems 
would produce a similar WiFi based alternative connectivity system, but would do so 
automatically, without human intervention.  These two elements are (a) mesh architecture 
and (b) ad hoc configurability. 
 
WiFi systems as currently familiar to American users are deployed in a terminal-
based station architecture, similar to a mobile phone system.  We largely use WiFi 
devices to connect to a fixed gateway to the Internet.  This is neither the only way, nor 
necessarily the most efficient way, to deploy an unlicensed wireless system.  A number of 
companies, beginning at least with Rooftop Community Networks in the mid-1990s and 
developed most extensively in DARPA projects, have developed an approach called 
wireless mesh network architecture.  In a mesh, every node, every device, represents both 
a user node and a component of the infrastructure.  The purpose of mesh architecture is to 
create multiple possible paths between any two points in the network, such that for any 
given required end-to-end link, there are multiple possible paths at any given moment.  
As a result, if any one or a number of nodes in the system goes down because it lost 
power, or because its owner is a mobile unit that went out of range, or because a tree has 
fallen and blocked a transmission path given the propagation characteristics of the carrier 
frequency, nodes still active on the network can identify and compute new paths from 
any point, to any other point, in the network.  A mesh network has no single point of 
failure. Redundancy of possible links replaces any single base station as a critical node of 
transmission, and replaces any efforts at making that single base station durable and 
impregnable to achieve a survivable communications system.  Mesh networks can 
combine repeater networks—that is, each node helps the transmitting node to forward 
messages to their intended recipient, thereby reducing the power necessary to achieve 
effective communication and making the signal less subject to interference—and multi-
                                                 
3 Peter Myers, In A Pinch, Wi-Fi Fills Gap, New York Times (October 4, 2001). 
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user detection—allowing the receiver to cooperate with its neighbors’ antennae better to 
filter out interference and correctly to decode a message from a transmitter. 
 
An independent characteristic of these mesh networks is that many of them are 
also ad hoc networks.  An ad hoc network is one that has no fixed infrastructure.  Each 
node is an end user of the network, as well as a component of the network infrastructure.  
As a node is turned on, it searches for neighbors and announces itself to neighboring 
systems.  It provides its own information, and in return receives information about its 
next neighbors and the network topology, or at least the near network topology.  Nodes 
continue to inform each other at intervals about their presence and availability, roughly in 
the way that Internet routers do.  Ad hoc architecture adds immense survivability to the 
network through its capacity to self-heal.  Because each node can serve as infrastructure, 
and because the network is designed to be self-configuring as each node joins and leaves 
the network without requiring any dedicated infrastructure prior to the existence of usable 
nodes, an ad hoc network can deal with failures automatically and as part of the same 
process by which the network is formed in the normal course of its use.   
 
In combination, ad hoc mesh networks are highly survivable in the event of an 
attack or other substantial disruption.    Because of their mesh architecture, they are 
designed to create high degrees of redundant optional physical paths from any point in 
the network to any other point.  Because of their ad hoc nature, they can adapt to radical 
changes in the environment, and recombine the components that survive into a 
communication system after an attack, using the very same characteristics that are built 
into them to allow them to form in the first place, when each node is first deployed. 
 
While none of these technologies is already a major market presence, neither is 
any of them futuristic.  The properties of repeater networks and multiuser detection in 
mesh networks and ad hoc architectures have become an area of burgeoning research.4 A 
number of practical implementations and businesses are being developed and deployed in 
this space, including Mesh Networks and Packethop, both civilian commercializations of 
DARPA-funded projects aimed at providing the military with robust ad hoc mobile data 
networks, and Tropos.  The first generation of ad hoc wireless mesh technologies, like 
Rooftop Networks (later Nokia Rooftop), preceded the explosion of WiFi, and therefore 
had to build the devices, the radio link protocols, and the network.  This created a high 
entry barrier for adoption, because unless an entire neighborhood could be persuaded to 
join the network, buying one or two devices would provide little benefit to their users 
until a certain threshold adoption was in place, and a lack of economies of scale in 
production made the equipment unnecessarily expensive.  The new generation of 
businesses focusing on ad hoc mesh networking can now rely on existing deployed 
wireless devices that are adopted by their users for mobile access that is “tethered” to an 
access point or cell site.  What this new generation of products does is provide a software 
implementation that allows these already existing devices—most ubiquitously now WiFi 
enable devices—to form ad hoc mesh networks.   
 
                                                 
4 For a brief bibliography and description of the research, see Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of 
Wireless Communications, 16 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 25,44-47 (2002). 
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Usefully for this paper, the first market into which these firms are selling is the 
public safety market.  During the first quarter of 2004, a number of field deployments for 
public safety high speed mobile data networks have been undertaken.  Garland, Texas 
and Medford, Oregon are deploying ad hoc mesh networks based on the Mesh Networks 
technology for use by their first responders.  San Mateo California and North Miami 
Beach, Florida, have also begun to deploy an ad hoc wireless mesh network for first 
responder high speed data access, from Tropos.  Both of these solutions rely on providing 
some fixed backbone access points, on the cellular style, instead of on a purely ad hoc 
infrastructure, but also enable each device to operate as a network node that is adaptable 
ad hoc to achieve survivability.  The backbone is only necessary because of the relatively 
small number of nodes involved.  If nodes were universally distributed throughout the 
relevant environment, there would be no need to seed the environment with fixed nodes.  
San Francisco, Marin County, and California State participants in the Golden Gate Safety 
Network ran a successful informal trial of PacketHop Inc.’s solution, based on a purely 
ad hoc mobile network with no preexisting backbone, in February 2004.  The test 
reportedly enabled three different systems, whose traditional radio systems are not 
interoperable, to form an ad hoc, wireless local network on both sides of the bridge and in 
the water, and to bridge this ad hoc network to a command center—all enabling voice, 
text, and video to be exchanged among a number of fixed and mobile stations 
participating in the exercise.   
 
While the technologies are reasonably well understood, their implications as a 
model of peer production of connectivity and survivability of networks is less 
emphasized.  They are still packaged as either last mile solutions that competitive access 
providers could offer to compete with cable or DSL—this was the pitch of the first 
generation—or as approaches for a single entity—usually a municipality—to provision 
its own needs using its own network of devices and users as both the network and the 
users.  This is so largely because mesh networks require some threshold density, derived 
from the power constraints regulations impose on unlicensed devices, to achieve the state 
where any given individual could purchase a single unit and be reasonably assured that 
when he or she turns that unit on, it will have neighbors with whom to form a 
metropolitan or wide area network.  Last mile carriers or single entities can invest in 
strategically located fixed backbone nodes to assure connectivity under most conditions.  
While achieving threshold density is a genuine transition problem, as a matter of business 
rationale, a carrier or a fixed backbone are not necessary for the survivability of the 
architecture itself once a sufficient number of individual users have joined the network to 
create the redundancy.  Indeed, a carrier is more a potential source of failure, because if 
configuration is dependent on a carrier, rather than attainable locally be each node and its 
neighbors, then carrier-operated nodes/base stations become potential points of failure.    
 
Once mesh networking becomes a software overlay on top of WiFi devices, the 
path to a municipal level mesh network made of end user devices is fairly straightforward 
to map—even if not without some bumps.  You start with the frustrations of any given 
household that there may be dead spots in the house, or in the yard.  You add that the 
household has at least two WiFi-enabled devices.  A utility that allows a users to place 
the desktop or laptop in such a location vis-à-vis the access point so that it bridges to the 
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dead spots, and also allows a visiting friend to check their email from their PDA in the 
yard becomes an obvious extension for off the shelf WiFi devices.  Individual consumers, 
seeking to fulfill their own needs for wireless networking in the home or their business 
place, will provision devices that can cooperate to form a highly redundant, self-
configuring and self-healing wireless network.  Which leaves genuine policy questions 
regarding for example, how to make sure that people share their wireless capacity with 
each other to provide municipal coverage or how to coax people into giving public safety 
or mission critical data priority, at least in emergencies.  These become the subject of the 
kind of policy interventions I outline in Part V.   
 
For now, all that is necessary to realize is that we are already seeing the 
emergence of device-based wireless connectivity, that is built on top of an already-widely 
adopted infrastructure of devices—WiFi equipment.  What is special and unusual about 
this connectivity infrastructure is that it requires no carrier, no fixed backbone, and no 
centralized source of investment.  It could be built spontaneously, out of cooperative 
protocols implemented on top of end-user capitalized and owned equipment.  If this were 
done, the metropolitan-level networks that could form would provide a distinct benefit to 
the owners of the equipment that participated in making the ad hoc mesh transport 
network—it would give them a last mile that they were all privileged to access, and 
would therefore enable tremendous competition in broadband Internet access—having 
circumvented the only major bottleneck to competition in that area, the last mile of 
physical connectivity to the Net.  These networks would have highly redundant physical 
links, large degrees of excess wireless transport capacity by reusing spectrum and 
providing resources to the network whenever the device was not actively transmitting or 
receiving information—which in an Internet-model of communications is much of the 
time.   This system of user-owned, cooperatively created wireless transport networks 
would then be available, with the right regulatory system or incentives, as a source of 
survivable carriage capacity in the face of emergency—irrespective whether its source 
were intentional attack, system failure, or some external stochastic event, like a hurricane 
that brings down major connection links.  Understanding why it is that a user-based 
network of sharing can emerge, and the motivations and information characteristics of 
such sharing networks will provide the basis for the recommendations regarding how to 
optimize the adoption of such connectivity-producing cooperation, and how to coax its 
users-owners into making their connectivity available as a survivable backup system for 
mission critical communications. 
 
In the ideal scenario, during an emergency, or in the event of a major disruption, 
such as an attack on a major wired switching point, public safety officials would be able 
to rely on the widespread availability of wireless nodes to provide them with survivable 
communications, at the basic connectivity layer.  If every apartment and house, or every 
other apartment or house, had a wireless node, connected in a mesh with some other set 
of neighbors, achieving coverage throughout a metropolitan area, it would be practically 
impossible to bring down communications capacity in that metropolitan area except by 
annihilating a very large portion of the homes in an area.  The more the device 
manufacturers are permitted to build their equipment with dynamic power management, 
so as to increase or decrease power as hop distance requires, the more survivable the 
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network would be everywhere, because the lower the threshold density required for 
connectivity.  Survivability and ubiquity of connectivity are achieved, in such a system, 
not through providing a particularly impervious access point, but by seeding a network of 
devices, installed by individuals throughout a metropolitan area for their own personal 
needs, and available to provide backup connectivity everywhere, anywhere, in a way that 
is highly robust to attack because redundant, adaptive, and self-healing or capable of 
recombining itself through dynamic reconfiguration. 
 
One common objection would be the concern that wireless communications are 
less secure than wired communications?  The answer is that there are two distinct 
meanings to the question.  The first and more common meaning is: is the data secure? Is 
the data capable of being read by an enemy?  The answer to that is like the answer to all 
Internet communications.  Communications are as safe as the encryption they use.  No 
more and no less.  A well encrypted bit stream will take a lot of time and money to 
decrypt.  Its content is secure even if the whole bitstream is acquired by an enemy.  
Moreover, because of the packetized, multi-path nature of communications in a mesh 
network, acquiring the entire bitstream is not a trivial task.  The second meaning of 
“security” in this context concerns whether the link between a and b (friends) can be 
disrupted by enemies x, y.  The answer to that question is the same answer to the question 
of survivability in general.  If the most that an enemy can do is cause the desired 
communications to lose packets, or to fail altogether, the answer is in the survivability of 
the system, not in the imperviousness of the signal of a single link.  To conclude, then, a 
wireless mesh network can provide a highly survivable network, deployed and owned by 
many users and manufactured by device manufacturers, rather than service providers who 
“own spectrum”.  Data that it carries is no less secure than any Internet communication, 
wired or wireless—its security dependant on the strength of data encryption, not any 
supposed physical imperviousness of the physical link channel.   
 
2. Distributed data storage and retrieval  
 
The second piece of the puzzle for provisioning a survivable computation and 
communications infrastructure is data storage and retrieval.  Here, as I mentioned in the 
beginning of this article, we have an extraordinarily robust example of such a system 
already in operation.  It utilizes the storage capacity of millions of end-user computers to 
store data in redundant storage.  It uses their distributed processing power to search for it.  
And it uses their excess bandwidth to retrieve it on a global scale.  I am speaking, of 
course, of the peer-to-peer file sharing networks that have been used so successfully as a 
survivable, adaptive, self-healing system of data storage and retrieval.  Despite a series of 
attacks on major points of failure, and in the case of Napster, a successful shutdown of 
the main point of data search and location, the data survived in user-owned storage 
media, new systems of search and retrieval were created, and these in turn proved 
substantially more distributed, and highly resistant to attack from a persistent enemy—to 
wit, the recording industry backed by the force of the United States and other sympathetic 
governments.  While one may argue as to whether the particular use to which this system 
has been put is desirable or not, that is not the point.  The point is that Napster 
introduced, and Gnutella, Kazaa, Grokster, Aimster, and the many other systems that 
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followed it developed, a highly survivable system for data storage and retrieval with 
tremendous resilience, redundancy, capacity to migrate data across the network to where 
it is most needed, and a high resilience to geographically or topologically focused attacks, 
as well as to diffuse injections of malicious data into the system.   
 
The first major peer-to-peer file sharing network, Napster, relied on decentralized 
storage and retrieval, with one major deviation—a centralized server to store information 
about which peer had what music.  While peers then communicated directly with each 
other and downloaded music one from the other’s computer from one end of the network 
to another, no peer could communicate directly with the other without first identifying the 
relevant other by reference to a central listing.  This made the communications protocol 
simple to design and execute, it made the system highly scalable, but also vulnerable to 
attack and failure.  The particular attack on that server was legal, and the failure a court 
ordered closure.  But the weakness was architectural—there was a single point of attack 
that could bring the system down.  The response of technology developers was to treat 
the legal attack like any other failure, and to design a system that did not offer a single 
target.  The result was Gnutella, and a class of approaches to peer-to-peer network design 
that avoided creating a center that would be vulnerable to attack.  Each node in the 
network would tell some number of its neighbors what it had on its hard drive.  Each 
node looking for a song would query its neighbors for the song.  If both information 
about what everyone has, and about what every one wanted, propagated in this way 
throughout the network, then anyone who wanted anything that anyone else had could 
find it.  The problem with this approach was that it required a lot of overhead, and the 
overhead increased as more users joined.  This required some tradeoff between 
comprehensiveness of availability of material and the information cost required to 
recognize what people have and what people want.   
 
Gnutella worked reasonably well up to a point, but was not perfect.  FastTrack, 
with its best known clients KaZaa and Morpheus, was an improvement in adding 
structure to the network of peers, but structure that was not sufficiently centralized, 
stable, or single-point-dependent to suffer the failure of Napster.  FastTrack introduced 
Supernodes—a dynamically determined class of nodes in the network that offer the 
functionality of the Napster server on an ad hoc, dynamically reconfigurable basis.  
Based on their material characteristics—underutilized processing power and bandwidth 
of their connection—the software assigns to users “Supernode” status.  Instead of every 
node telling every other node everything it had and everything it wanted, as in the 
Gnutella model, every node sends the list of its available files and requests to its nearest 
Supernode.  Supernodes tell each other—keeping network traffic and information 
overhead low, while retaining redundancy, flexibility in the distribution of the location of 
information, load balancing among nodes with more or less free capacity, and flexible 
rerouting around points of failure—or self-healing.  The result is a system that is even 
more widely used than Napster was at its height, yet offers no single point of failure for 
attack.  Like Napster, KaZaa was sued.  Unlike Napster, KaZaa won in the Dutch courts.  
But even if KaZaa had lost, the Fastrack network architecture would not have been 
eliminated.  If it had been shut down by litigation, there are other clients that could have 
taken its place effortlessly, or new network architectures on the same principle that could 
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have been written.  The physical components of the network are individually owned by 
users.  The connections among these individually-owned nodes are software-
implemented network relations running on top of the Internet protocol.  There is no 
“network” to shut down. There are only algorithms that tell user computers how to 
organize themselves into a network on an ad hoc, dynamically updated basis.  As long as 
people have files on their hard drives that can be run on any generic computer, and as 
long as they want to share these, there is nothing that can be done to prevent them from 
using these architectural principles to do so.  This is why the present attacks by the 
recording industry are aimed at hardware regulation—forcing the computer and consumer 
electronics industries to build equipment that will not run generic files, but only 
permission-controlled files5—and at raising the costs of sharing to users, by suing users 
civilly and by pushing criminal enforcement authorities to prosecute users criminally.6   
 
 From Napster to KaZaa, file sharing systems relied on complete redundant copies 
existing around the network.  Other systems, however, have begun to increase both 
survivability and secrecy by breaking down individual documents and storing pieces of 
data on different computers, encrypted, so that no user who has a piece of a file on their 
hard drive can compromise the document, and they allow data “retrieval” to occur as a 
recombination of bits of files, rather than as retrieval of whole files, from many different 
points in the network, accompanied by what are essentially assembly instructions for 
recombining a replica of the document at the point of retrieval.  These approaches include 
at the simplest level BitTorrent, which is an approach towards accelerating downloads in 
music sharing peer-to-peer networks that replicates portions of songs and allows a user to 
download segments of a song from different peers, load balancing for bandwidth and 
availability across nodes.   
 
An earlier and more complete implementation of this approach, as well as a more 
readily recognizable system of data storage and retrieval that is even more resilient in its 
characteristics, is Ian Clark’s Freenet.7 Freenet was designed for censorship-resistant 
publication, not for easy music downloading.  It trades off easy availability of files for 
music usage for a series of security measures that prevent the owners of the hard drives 
on which the data resides from knowing what is on their hard drive or controlling what is 
stored on their hard drive.  This step is crucial in shifting from distributed storage and 
retrieval systems that are intended to give the owners of the contributed hardware access 
to the information stored, towards a more generally applicable facility for storing data in 
a survivable form by harnessing widely distributed excess storage capacity on the Net.  If 
banks, hospitals, or national security bodies are to harness distributed storage approaches, 
either on individually owned unaffiliated computers or even only on employee computers 
harnessed for this purpose, then the function of providing data storage capacity must be 
separated from the capacity to read the data stored from the computer providing the 
storage capacity.  This is precisely what Freenet does: segmenting documents among 
                                                 
5 107 S. 2048, Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (March 21, 2002). 
6 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Fight Against Illegal File-Sharing is Moving Overseas, New York Times March 
31, 2004 (describing transnational efforts, including criminal prosecutions in Italy). 
7 See Ian Clark, Oscar Sandberg, Brandon Wiley, and Theodore Hong, Freenet: A Distributed, Anonymous 
Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000), available http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/clarke00freenet.html. 
13 
 
drives so that no single drive has the whole of the document, and preventing any single 
drive from becoming a significant point of failure or compromise.  In order to improve 
access, the system automatically migrates the topological location of data based on 
demand patterns, so that, for example, documents critical of a repressive government that 
are often accessed by residents of that country will topologically migrate towards 
network locations that would increase the speed and availability of document retrieval.   
 
 A similar, but perhaps even more ambitious project, though not yet a deployed 
system, is OceanStore.  OceanStore is a concept developed by John Kubiatowicz at UC 
Berkeley for what he describes as a global scale, self-repairing, secure and persistent 
storage system.  It is built precisely on the concept of ubiquitous computing, which 
provides ubiquitous storage in units small and large (from desktops to handhelds, and 
from automobiles and microwave ovens to walls and shoes in the not too distant future).  
The particulars of the system are fascinating.8  The overarching principle, however, is all 
that we need here.  Storage exists almost wherever computation exists.  And computation 
exists almost everywhere.  Connectivity is also being brought in anywhere, mostly for 
purposes of controlling mechanical systems—Zensys, for example, is selling ad hoc mesh 
network enabled WiFi radios implemented in a $5 chip in anything from air conditioning 
units to refrigerators.  When connectivity will in fact become ubiquitous, we have a 
global medium of storage as long as we solve a series of questions involving security, 
privacy, and authentication—all of which are done with encryption irrespective of 
whether the physical network is diversely owned or under single entity control—
resilience over time, which Kubiatowicz proposes to do by migrating replicated data from 
older servers to newer ones automatically, so as to avoid sensitivity to units going off line 
and losing data, and adaptability to failure and attack.  The survivability is addressed by 
wide fragmentation and distribution of redundant file fragments.  Kubiatowicz’s Tapestry 
retrieval, or rather recombination, system weaves the files out of fragments distributed 
across many computers, none of which is readable by the owner of the storage medium 
on which it resides.  As we saw with mesh networks, peer-to-peer file sharing systems, or 
FreeNet, Kubiatowicz’s system relies on a peer-based model, using the high degree of 
redundant storage/caching capacity owned by individuals distributed throughout the 
world and the network, but assuming that nodes are only mostly, not always, available or 
connected, and that they are at best partially reliable—either in technical reliability terms 
or in agent trust terms.  The system as a whole uses redundancy of the basic desired 
capacity—storage—coupled with adaptive algorithms to achieve survivability through 
adaptation and recombination, and to manage load balancing and usability despite the 
unreliability of any given node.  These same everyday design components that allow the 
system to operate efficiently under normal operating conditions are also germane to 
assuring the survivability of the storage and retrieval system as a whole.  
 
It is important to note here that the diversity of the nodes—their topological and 
geographic dispersion, the diversity of users and uses that are their primary tasks—
immensely increase the complexity of the network they form and in the task of assuring a 
steady flow of functionality from a network formed from such nodes.  You cannot store a 
unique copy of a document that is needed on average every 30 minutes on a laptop that 
                                                 
8 See Sean Rhea et. al., Maintenance Free Global Data Storage, IEEE Internet Computing, (Sep. Oct 2001). 
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sometimes goes on a plane and is unavailable for six or twelve hours.  But this same 
characteristic also adds to the survivability of the system as a whole.  The fact that not all 
nodes are always connected increases the survivability of the system, because any node 
not connected to the network at a moment of attack is safer from the attack.  It can later 
become available as a source of backup storage to recreate the data if all nodes connected 
to the network at the time of attack are affected.  Having a storage and retrieval system 
resident on many devices, owned and used by many different users, in many locations, 
with more or less stable network locations and availability and with highly diverse usage 
patterns makes for a complex, but highly survivable, system. 
 
3. Distributed computing 
 
Distributed computing is a particular implementation of the broader phenomenon 
of parallel computing.  Parallel computing is driven by the economic fact that it is 
cheaper to lash together large numbers of commodity processors and divide a task among 
them than it is to build a single fast computer capable of running the same number of 
operations in a given time frame on a single processor.  Imagine that a computation 
requires 100 operations to run in a time unit t.  If the cost of a processor that runs 50 
operations per second is c, the cost of a processor that runs 100 operations per second is 
4c, and the task of coordinating among more than one processor imposes a 30% loss of 
computation efficiency, then at a price of 3c a computer designer could build a processor 
capable of running [3*50*0.7=]105 operations a second.  This would be more efficient 
than investing in fabricating the more expensive (4c) single processor system that would 
perform 100 operations per second.  This simple description explains why parallel 
computing came to dominate more exotic-materials-based approaches in supercomputing 
over the course of the 1990s.  Parallelization became over that period a major area in 
computer engineering—concerned with how to design problems so that they were 
amenable to computation in many discrete computations that can be run in parallel, 
without relying to heavily one on each other for inputs.   
 
Distributed computing involves the same calculus, but instead of being built 
around systems that lash together thousands of processors in a single box, that are all 
connected very closely to minimize communication time among the processors and from 
them to the system memory, they are built around tens to hundreds of thousands, and in 
one case millions, of processors, which are donated by Internet users during their 
downtime.9  Problems for such systems get parallelized on the assumption that vast 
computation is available, vastly more than in single proprietary supercomputers, but that 
no single processor is reliably available, and communications among processors and to 
system memory are orders of magnitude slower than those in a supercomputer.  Using 
this approach, SETI@Home has become the fastest supercomputer in the world, 
performing, as of the end of 2003, calculations at a speed seven times greater than the 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Michael Shirts and Vijay Pande, Screen Savers of the World Unite!, 290 Science 1903-04 
(2000). 
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fastest supercomputer that IBM was able to build at that point in time,10 60% faster than 
the NEC Earth Simulator, formally the fastest supercomputer in the world at the same 
time, and four times as fast as the next fastest supercomputer.11  SETI@Home harnesses 
idle processor cycles of about 4,500,000 users around the world.  The users download a 
small screen saver. When the users are not using their computer, the screen saver starts 
up, downloads problems for calculation—in the case of SETI@Home, radio astronomy 
signals to be analyzed for regularities as part of the search for extraterrestrial 
intelligence—and calculates the problem it has downloaded.  When a solution is 
calculated, the program will automatically send its results to the main site.  The cycle will 
continue for as long as, and every time that, the computer is idle from its user’s 
perspective so that the screensaver is activated.  I have elsewhere described SETI@Home 
and other distributed computing projects on the Internet today in more detail.12   
 
 Distributed computing provides a readily available model for producing a system 
of survivable computation capacity, when combined with the insights one gets from the 
model of ad hoc mesh networks and distributed storage systems.  While the focus in 
distributed computing today is on its cost/performance characteristics, another critical 
feature of distributed computing is its topological diversity. No attack or failure in a 
particular geographic location, or in a particular portion of the network, will disable the 
entire array of processors participating in a distributed computing exercise.  Because it 
relies on parallelization that explicitly assumes nodes that are highly variable and 
unreliable in terms of availability, and have extremely high delays in communications 
among processes and from processors to memory, distributed computing can tolerate 
many more points of failure and radicals shifts in availability of processors due to attack.  
Like a mesh network, a distributed computing system need not have any single point of 
failure, may run redundant processes, may reassign discrete pieces of computation to 
available nodes when nodes otherwise tasked with running a process do not deliver, and 
can load balance among the available processors according to their particular conditions 
of availability of processing and communications capacity.  In other words, such systems 
have the same characteristics of redundancy, adaptability, and a capacity for 
recombination as a basic design feature of their normal operation.  These make 
distributed computing system highly survivable.   
 
 Distributed computing also introduces us to another potential point of interest, 
which is less readily available (though still possible) for connectivity, but is shared with 
                                                 
10 IBM ASCI White, at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, could perform 7.3 Teraflops, See Top 500 
Supercomputer Sites, at http://www.top500.org/list/2003/06/, as compared to 54 Teraflops calculated by 
SETI@Home.  
11 SETI@Home statistics showed a speed of over 54 Teraflops per second.  The more traditional 
supercomputers,—where a single firm or organization builds on computation cluster from processors under 
its ownership or control achieved 35.8 Teraflops for the NEC Earth simulator, 13.9 Teraflops for the HP 
ASCI-Q at Los Alamos National Laboratories, the Linux Network with 7.6 Teraflops, and the IBM ASCI 
White mentioned in the preceding note, both at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories.  See Top 500 
Supercomputer Sites, at http://www.top500.org/list/2003/06/. These numbers and relationships offer, of 
necessity, a snapshot.  When looked at again five months later, the numbers for the mainstream 
supercomputers remained similar, but the number for SETI@Home had increased to over 64 Teraflops.  
12 Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of 
Economic Production, forthcoming 114 Yale L. J. __ (Nov. 2004). 
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distributed storage.  That is, that it can be implemented not only in reliance on the 
participation of individual users/equipment owners, but can also be implemented within a 
single enterprise, or within a coalition of enterprises.  Any enterprise that owns and 
places into operation in the hands of its employees thousands or tens of thousands of 
desktops, laptops, and handhelds, owned either by the firm or by its employees as work 
tools, or any alliance of enterprises with similar characteristics, can self-provision a 
substantial back-up emergency computation system solely from within enterprise or 
alliance resources.   
 
IV. Some economics of shareable goods  
 
1. What are shareable goods? 
 
The systems described in Part III share the following characteristics:  
 
1. They rely on widely distributed physical goods; 
2. That have excess capacity of some desideratum (transmission, storage, 
processing); 
3. They are privately owned by many distinct users 
4. Who pool their excess capacity without relying on either prices or 
managerial commands to motivate and coordinate the pooling 
 
The wide distribution of physical capital goods capable of provisioning some level of 
capacity of the desideratum—be it storage, processing, or communications carriage 
capacity—is a direct requirement of survivability.  It is the wide distribution, and the 
diversity of types of nodes, and their geographic and topological diversity that makes the 
systems they combine to form survivable.  This design requirement—that the system 
integrate the capacity of widely distributed, diverse physical goods that generate 
capacity—raises an unremarkable economic question—who will invest in these goods, 
and why will they pool their capacity? 
 
The second, third, and fourth characteristics shared by the systems described offer 
an unorthodox answer to this fairly straightforward economic question.  The system is 
provisioned by many different users, who are not otherwise affiliated, and who 
coordinate their behavior without reference to a price mechanism or a managerial 
hierarchy.  These users pool their privately owned, standard economic goods—the CPUs, 
hard drives, and wireless transceivers are all privately owned rival goods, they are not 
public goods, and at least the CPUs (for processing) and hard drives do not have network 
externalities/demand side economies of scale.  The owners of units that participate in 
these practices appear to do so for a variety of motivations, ranging from some that look 
like altruism—in the case of distributed computing—to others that look like in-kind 
exchange that is clearly instrumental, but not quite barter—because it does not engage in 
accounting of the values given or received, and seems to tolerate high variability and lack 
of correlation among contributions to and calls on the system—or free riding, if you 
will—as in the case of file-sharing.  My point in this part will be to (a) provide a set of 
sufficiency conditions for this kind of non-market-based (in the sense of an explicit price 
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mechanism), non-firm-based social provisioning of a good or service that depends on 
material inputs; and (b) provide a transactions costs-based and motivation-base 
explanation of why agents might choose to act through a social-relations transactional 
framework rather than through a price-based or firm-based transactional framework.  I 
have provided the more complete statement of the argument elsewhere13 and here will 
only restate the central elements of the argument. 
 
 There is a class of goods that have the following two characteristics.  First, they 
are lumpy, or indivisible—at a given technological state, they cannot be produced in 
quantities that precisely match demand for them.  The minimum size of a CPU available 
in markets today, for example, exceeds the processing needs of many home users; CPU 
capacities, hard drive capacities, wireless transmission capabilities increase in coarsely-
grained intervals, such that the probability that any population of users would be able to 
find a distribution of technically available units that precisely matches their demand for 
the capacity of these units is low.  Second, the package size or granularity of the 
indivisible good is relatively small—unlike an airplane or a steam engine—and their cost, 
relative to the degree and distribution of wealth in a society, is sufficiently low such that 
a substantial portion of the population could justify putting them into service to satisfy 
their own individual or household needs.  I called these “mid-grained” goods because 
they are neither so coarse-grained that putting them into service necessarily requires 
pooling the demand of many users—through a market, a firm, or a club, for example—
nor so fine-grained that an individual could purchase precisely the amount of capacity the 
individual requires and no more. 
 
 Where these two conditions hold, we will see a distribution in the society of 
capacity-generating goods that are widely owned by many users for their own personal 
uses, but have excess capacity relative to the needs of their owners.  This describes the 
state of CPUs, storage media, and wireless transmission devices today.   It also describes 
the carriage capacity of automobiles in the United States today, and underlies the 
phenomenon of carpooling, which accounts for roughly 17% of work related commuting 
trips—four times more than all forms of public transit combined.14  It could one day, 
depending on the costs of home solar power electricity generators on the one hand and of 
fossil fuels on the other hand, describe electricity generation.    
 
 I call goods with these characteristics “shareable goods,” because when they hold, 
individual owners of capital goods can, if they choose, share their excess capacity in 
social sharing or exchange networks—relying on social and psychological cues and 
motivations, rather than on money or commands, to inform and motivate behavior.  The 
conditions are not necessary for sharing to occur—people share goods that have no 
excess capacity in acts of pure altruism where they in fact sacrifice something for the 
good of another, or exchange them in complex instrumental gift and social exchange 
systems.  Conversely, people sell excess capacity of their “shareable” goods as I define 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 See John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, 57 
TRANSPORTATION Q., at *? tbl. 3 (2003); see also Sharing Nicely, supra note 12 (surveying carpooling 
literature and available data). 
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them here.  They may, for example, sell a used book in a second hand book market rather 
than lend it to a friend—indeed there are two online distributed computation projects to 
which people can sell their computer cycles.  My claim is much narrower.  These 
conditions make social relations-based clearance of the excess capacity feasible.  
Whether it is desirable or not—which may include the question of under what conditions 
it would be more efficient to share or exchange socially than to sell—is a separate 
consideration. Whether social sharing or exchange will or will not occur—even if it is 
feasible—will also depends on cultural conditions—most importantly, are these shareable 
goods deployed in a society with a well- or poorly-developed social transaction 
framework on the one hand, or market transactional framework, on the other hand.   
 
 So, the characteristics of shareable goods define conditions which, if present, are 
sufficient to make clearance of a set of physical capital goods through a social sharing or 
exchange system feasible.  The question we turn to now is what might be reasons for the 
excess capacity of these goods to be cleared through a social transactional framework, as 
opposed to a market, or price-based, transactional framework.   
 
 2.  Differences in information costs 
 
 Social transactional frameworks and market transactional frameworks each have 
substantial and different setup costs.  Markets require the definition of property rights and 
contracting arrangements, legal enforcement systems, often physical exchange locations 
and information flow mechanisms, etc.  Social arrangements require norms to be 
developed, social networks to be formed, cultural values of cooperation inculcated, etc.  
Assuming, however, that a society has invested in both types of transactional 
frameworks, individual marginal transactions within each system also have a marginal 
cost.  We have long understood that these marginal transaction costs can lead resources to 
be allocated through a managerial firm-based transactional framework, rather than 
through a price-based transactional framework.  What we add here is that a similar 
calculus could lead resources to be most efficiently cleared through a social sharing and 
exchange system rather than through the price system.   
 
For purposes of goods that meet the focused definition of shareable goods, there 
are two discrete differences between the information characteristics of market, as 
opposed to a social, transactions, the first more important than the second.  A market 
transaction, in order to be efficient by its own measures, must be clearly demarcated as to 
what it includes, so that it can be priced efficiently.  That price must then be paid in 
equally crisply delineated currency.  Even if initially a transaction may be declared to 
involve sale of “an amount reasonably required to produce the required output”, for a 
price “ranging from x to y,” at some point what was provided and what is owed must be 
crystallized and fixed for a formal exchange.  The crispness, or completeness of the 
information regarding all aspects of the transaction, is a functional requirement of the 
price system, and derives from the precision and formality of the medium of exchange—
currency—and the ambition to provide refined representations of the comparative value 
of marginal decisions through denomination in the exchange medium that represents 
these incremental value differences.  Social exchange, on the other hand, does not require 
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the same degree of crispness.  As Maurice Godelier put it, “the mark of the gift between 
close friends and relatives … is not the absence of obligations, it is the absence of 
‘calculation.’”15  The point is that social exchange does not require defining: “I will lend 
you my car and help you move these five boxes on Monday, and in exchange you will 
feed my fish next July,” as it would require “I will move five boxes on Tuesday for $100, 
six boxes for $120,” etc.  Instead, actions enter into a cloud of good will or membership, 
out of which each agent can understand him or herself as being entitled to a certain flow 
of dependencies or benefits in exchange for continued cooperative behavior.  This may be 
an ongoing relationship between two people, a small group like a family or group of 
friends, and up to a general level of generosity among strangers that makes for a decent 
society.    
 
Because the difference in cost is at the margin per-transaction, it increases linearly 
with the number of discrete transactions necessary to obtain a sufficient quantum of 
capacity to achieve the goals of a person relying on flows of capacity from the owners of 
the capital goods that provide the capacity.  Imagine that in order to run one computation 
one needs the excess capacity of only one computer, and the difference in transaction 
costs between using market based clearance and social exchange is $x. If, instead, in 
order to run one computation the person seeking to use excess capacity of others needs to 
pool the excess processing power of two idle computers, then the cost difference is $2x 
per computation, and so forth.  This pattern indicates that when slack capacity is located 
in small amounts distributed among many owners, it becomes increasingly more costly to 
harness that excess capacity through markets than through social exchange systems.  
Given that the interest of each individual owner to buy as little excess capacity as 
technically feasible places a downward pressure on the expected amount of each unit’s 
excess capacity, shareable goods are likely to have this characteristic—widespread 
distribution of excess capacity in smallish dollops.  This is precisely the domain in which 
shareable goods become very interesting as objects of social sharing and exchange, rather 
than market exchange, and in which they describe well distributed computing, file 
sharing, and ad hoc mesh wireless networks. 
 
 The second information difference is that markets sacrifice texture for 
computability and comparability.  In order to allow the comparison of different courses of 
action in a clearly computable form, market systems must abstract from the particulars of 
any given sought transaction to a limited set of standardized data—price, quantity, more-
or-less standardized quality measures.  Social systems, on the other hand, tend to use 
more “analog” or textured modalities of information rendering, which make decisions 
less clearly computable, but likely provide more richly textured information about the 
relevant transaction.  The answer to an agent’s question “should I sell my excess 
processor cycles at all, and if so should I sell them to a or b,” is informed in different 
ways when the relevant data are: “a will pay me 0.2 cents per processing hour, and b will 
pay me 0.25 cents per processing hour,” as compared to “a is dedicated to finding 
extraterrestrial life, b is dedicated to finding promising compounds for AIDS drugs, and I 
was so close to John who died in the early days of the pandemic….”   
 
                                                 
15 Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift 5 (1997). 
20 
 
The tradeoff between formal clarity and computability, on the one hand, and 
texture on the other hand, suggests that social systems will be relatively weaker in 
organizing actions for which there are clear, computable, but fine differences between 
alternative courses of action.  Conversely, such systems will be particularly valuable as 
information processing systems where the context, precise nature of the alternative 
possible actions, and the range of possible outcomes are persistently vague or difficult to 
specify formally. To the extent that information about production opportunities, 
cooperative actions, and motivational inputs can be represented effectively through social 
communications systems, it would represent a more complete statement of the factors 
relevant to agent’s decisions than could information available in systems—like the price 
system—that require formalization of the data so that they can be represented adequately 
for the particular process of computation defined as necessary to a decision in those 
systems.  This is particularly important where uncertainty cannot be eliminated at an 
acceptable cost.   
 
 3. Differences in motivation structures 
 
 Markets and social production systems appeal to different motivations.  Actual 
behavior is diversely motivated in either type of transactional setting, and agents may act 
for composite motivations in either setting.  But the basic motivation in market 
transaction is to improve material welfare.  The motivations in social settings are more 
varied.  They range from material instrumental motivations—such as when a helps take 
care of b’s child today, expecting to be able to call on b some time in the future when a 
needs help with his children—intrinsic psychological motivations—such as acting in a 
way that makes one understand oneself to be a self-respecting, well adjusted member of 
society—and social relations building—such as spending time with friends—to pure 
altruism like donating blood to an unknown recipient.  This diversity of motivations, and 
the differences between market and social relations in harnessing them, would not matter 
if we thought that (a) all agents were identical in their motivational structure; and (b) the 
two types of motivation were purely cumulative.  In that case, working through the 
market or through social relations would motivate all agents identically, and the number 
and mix of agents would depend purely on the magnitude of the reward, not on its form 
(material welfare, social-psychological).  It also would not matter whether the total value 
of the reward was comprised purely of price, purely of social-psychological rewards, or 
in some mix—adding more of one or the other would always increase the level of 
activity. 
 
 But agents are diverse in their motivational preferences, and money and social-
psychological rewards are not cumulative.  The former is not a highly controversial 
claim; the latter more so.  The locus classicus of this latter question is the Titmuss-Arrow 
debate.  In his classic critique of the U.S. then-market-based blood system,16 Richard 
Titmuss found that the U.K., which had an all volunteer system, had lower hepatitis-
infected blood.  He claimed that when money was offered for blood, donors were driven 
away from donating blood, leaving money-seeking blood-sellers who did not care about 
the unobservable (at that time there was no relevant test for hepatitis) quality of what they 
                                                 
16 Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1971). 
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were selling.  Kenneth Arrow criticized Titumss interpretation—though not his basic 
finding of the differences in infection rates.  Arrow’s claim was that eliminating the 
market in blood supply could in fact remove incentives of the “bad blood” suppliers to 
give blood, thereby improving the overall quality of the blood supply.17  In other words, 
Arrow claimed that people are in fact diversely motivated, and that some people who will 
be moved for money will not similarly be moved for social reasons.  What he rejected, 
however, was the claim that by introducing a market in blood, by commodifying blood, 
we would crowd out the volunteer donors.  He saw the two systems as independent of 
each others—those moved to donate would donate, those moved to sell would sell.  
Adding money would therefore likely increase the activity, because it would bring sellers 
into the cycle of blood suppliers without crowding out volunteer donors.   
 
 Even this minimal divergence from an assumption that all agents are similarly 
motivated suggests that a system that is seeking to harness resources from widely 
divergent individuals needs to know something about the population it is seeking to 
harness.  Imagine that there are two types of agents, B, who are driven to do good in 
society, and C, who are driven to make money.  Imagine that putting a motivation scheme 
in place is costly.  The designer of a project that wishes to tap the resources under the 
control of these agents would want to choose the higher-yield strategy, and must study 
whether the population has more Bs or Cs: if the former, then the project organizer 
should invest in social-psychological motivations and vice versa.  Of course, if Arrow is 
right in his second critique of Titmuss, and if investing in motivation were costless, then 
the ideal strategy would be to include both motivations. 
 
Subsequent theoretical and empirical literature has substantially bolstered 
Titumss’s claim that introducing markets for an activity crowds out volunteer efforts 
towards that same activity.18  There are now quite extensive studies that show that adding 
money to an activity may decrease the level of activity from levels previously attained 
when the activity was carried on purely for social and psychological motivations.19  One 
theoretical framework—put forward in economics mostly by Bruno Frey—for explaining 
these findings is based in social psychology, and focuses on the introduction of monetary 
interventions being understood by agents as impairing their sense of self-determination 
                                                 
17 Kenneth Arrow Gifts and Exchanges, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 343, 351-55 (1971).   
18 For a more complete statement, see Sharing Nicely, supra note 12. 
19 See Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jege, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 15(5) 
J. Economic Surveys 589 (2001) (surveying the literature); See Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for Money (1997); 
Brnuo S. Frey, Inspiring Economics 52-72 (2001). T.F. Bewley, A Depressed Labor Market as Explained 
by Participants, 85 Am Econ. Rev. 250 (1995) (providing survey data about managers’ beliefs about the 
effects of incentive contracts); Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Organizational Form, 11 Organization Science 538 (2000) (describing effects of money-based intervention 
on willingness of workers to impart implicit knowledge to team mates); Bruno S. Frey and Felix 
Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 Am 
Econ. Rev. 746 (1997) (NIMBY phenomena increase, rather than decrease, when money is added in 
addition to arguments about helping the common weal); H. Kunreuther and D. Easterling, Are Risk-Benefit 
Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities? 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 252-256 (1990) (same). Uri Gneezy 
and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price 29 J. Legal. Stud. 1 (2000) (finding that introducing a fine for tardy 
pickup increased, rather than decreased, tardiness by parents). 
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and self-respect.20 An alternative causal explanation is formalized by Benabou and 
Tirole, who claim that the person receiving the monetary incentives infers that the person 
offering the compensation does not trust the offeree to do the right thing, or to do it well 
of their own accord, and the offeree’s self-confidence and intrinsic motivation to succeed 
are reduced to the extent that the offeree believes that the offeror—a manager or parent, 
for example—is better situated to judge the offeree’s abilities.21 These causal 
explanations may well be an important part of the story, but they tend to underplay the 
instrumental importance of social interactions to their participants, which has been so 
central to the claims of the social capital literature.22  For social capital to be not perfectly 
fungible with financial capital, as social capital is usually described, actions within a 
social framework must be non-fungible with actions in a market—otherwise market-
based behavior could accumulate social capital seamlessly.  It is fairly plausible to 
assume that ready availability of any given action or service from a market would debase 
the currency of that action as a mode of building social networks of reciprocity and social 
exchange.  The personal sacrifice and connection between the actor and reciprocator 
loses its value if the agent’s action is perfectly fungible with that of total strangers in the 
market.  This instrumental, social-capital based hypothesis for crowding out would then 
explain the empirical literature that shows that the introduction of money decreases 
reciprocating cooperation.23   
 
 The most likely implication of the empirical findings and the theoretical 
interpretations is that people are indeed diversely motivated.  They seek material welfare.  
They seek psychological coherence.  They seek social relations of affirmation and 
companionship, as well as relations of reciprocity and instrumental advantage.  The 
relationship between these various social-psychological motivations and the presence of 
money in the relationship is at least ambiguous.  It may be cumulative, with one adding to 
the value of the other.  It may, however, be negative—in particular, where the presence of 
money could undermine the quality of the social-psychological relationship.  Paying a 
friend at the end of a dinner party or paying one’s sexual partner are ready examples of 
stark cases where money would completely crowd out and social-psychological rewards 
                                                 
20 See Frey, Not Just for Money, supra, relying on the line of psychology literature he follows to Edward L. 
Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. Personality and Social 
Psychology, 105-15 (1971).   
21 Roland Bénabou, and Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Social Interactions. NBER Working Paper 
W7585 (March, 2000). 
22 See, e.g. Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action at 150-51 (2001) (Making the 
claim that “there are two ultimate (or primitive) rewards for human beings in a social structure: economic 
standing and social standing,” and elaborating a thesis where in both cases these represent relational 
standing, in terms of capacity to mobilize resources, some that can be mobilized by money, others those 
that can be mobilized by social relations);  James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital, 94 Supp. Am. J. Soc. S95, S106 (1988) (similarly is focused on the functional characteristics of 
social networks); Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Sociology, 1360-80 (1973); 
Mark Granovetter, Getting a Job (1974); Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection, Families, Friends and 
Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 Population and Development Rev. 1 (1980). 
23 In particular, studies that focus on crowding-out of reciprocity, are supportive of a social causal theory.  
See, e.g., Ernst Fehr and Simon Gechter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? IERE 
Zurich Working Paper,  No. 34, (April 2002) (describing laboratory experimental results for the effects of 
incentives on cooperation). 
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from the activity.24  But the relationship of money to social-psychological rewards is not 
a fixed or uniform.  At one time, being a “professional” paid athlete or performer 
detracted from the social respect one could earn in these fields.  That has now changed 
drastically.  In any given period, money can be culturally framed in ways that are 
congruent with esteem and social motivations, rather than opposed to them.  For example, 
an academic offered a million dollars to make a scientific claim would not gain any 
respect in academia—though may well decide to forgo the respect for the money and 
write the paper nonetheless.  The same academic who writes the paper in the pursuit of, 
and eventually receives, the Nobel Prize, gains respect rather than losing it.   
 
 If the relationship between money and social psychological motivations described 
here is correct, this has substantial implications for how one is to structure one’s activities 
in attempting to harness human behavior—be it labor or the contribution of excess 
resources like processor cycles.  If we return to the little problem of the actor trying to 
harness efforts or resources offered by a population of Bs and Cs, for example, then one 
has to assume the possibility of an even stronger loss of Bs from the introduction of 
money.  In other words, use of a cumulative activity—offering both money and social 
relations—will not lead to an aggregation of Bs and Cs.  It will affirmatively crowd out 
Bs, unless the person seeking to harness the agents finds a way of culturally framing the 
money so that it does not crowd out the socially-driven contributors.   
 
 It is possible, indeed likely, that there are different people with systematically 
different preferences on social psychological as opposed to monetary motivations.  But it 
is equally plausible that any given individual has different preferences along these 
dimensions at different stages of the day, week, month, and lifetime.  Once an agent has 
received enough money to maintain whatever material standard of living she aspires to in 
the relevant timeframe (today, this week, this lifetime—ready for retirement), her 
monetary appetite is at least partially satiated.  At that point, her relative appetite for 
companionship or psychological affirmation may increase, and she would divert her 
actions towards activities that would satisfy those motivations.  Anyone who looks 
forward to going home at the end of a workday or workweek and spending time with 
family and friends, rather than staying to work overtime, is experiencing such a 
motivation model.  In designing a system to harness contributions, then, one of the 
considerations must be how well the platform for harnessing the effort can be calibrated 
to allow people to participate only when they are at moment of the day or week when 
their preference for money is relatively satiated, and vice versa when one believes that 
money is likely to be the primary motivator for agents who are likely to participate in his 
project. 
 
 4. Information and motivation—cumulative considerations 
  
Anyone considering how to structure a transactional framework for harnessing 
resources—like CPUs, or storage media, or wireless capacity—is faced, then, with a 
choice among three transactional frameworks.  One can choose to try to structure the 
transaction through one of the two more widely used models—either a market-based 
                                                 
24 See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002). 
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transactional framework or internally, through an enterprise.  But one also could consider 
using a social sharing or exchange system.  Such a system is likely to have lower 
marginal information costs, provide its users more textured information, and will have a 
greater capacity to harness social-psychological motivations.   
 
In the case of shareable goods whose excess capacity is very widely distributed in 
relatively small incremental quanta—that is, in precisely the case that could be most 
valuable for constructing survivable backup systems for communications and 
computation infrastructures—the costs of using a market-based systems may be high, and 
the crowding out effect strong.  This is because in order to achieve a usable robust 
system, contributions from a very large number of discrete individuals, in many discrete 
instances, will have to be harnessed.  As the number of transactions necessary to achieve 
a working system increases, the relative per-transaction cost advantage of social sharing 
system will become more salient.  Furthermore, if each contributor is likely to provide a 
relatively small incremental contribution to the overall system, the amount of money that 
can be paid per user or per transaction is quite small.  Crowding out theory predicts that it 
is precisely where the negative effects of commodifying an activity are made to kick in 
by the introduction of payment for the activity, but the positive effects of adding money 
are low because the compensation offered is small, that the crowding out effect is likely 
to dominate and the activity level decline.  This does not necessarily mean that social 
sharing is the only feasible approach towards harnessing the large quantities of excess 
capacity that users connected to the Internet have for purposes of building survivable 
infrastructures.  But it does suggest that for those organizations or in those settings where 
a social transactional framework can be used, that framework will be more effective than 
using a market-based approach. 
 
 
Part V.  Some practical proposals for organization and policy 
 
 The basic point of the paper to this point has been to describe a particular class of 
survivable infrastructures for computation and communication—those that rely on widely 
distributed components that are also widely owned and shared by their owners 
cooperatively.  I suggested that the cooperative practices that underlie these behaviors are 
varied and diverse, and that they range from quite directly instrumental relations, as in the 
case of peer-to-peer file sharing systems, to a quite generally altruistic form, like 
SETI@Home.  In this last part I will briefly outline the approaches that organizations and 
individuals seeking to harness excess capacity in the traditional modalities—of markets 
and firms—might take, and then provide a more detailed analysis of what sort of policy 
interventions would be appropriate to foster the adoption of such cooperative practices 
for purposes of survivability more generally.   
 
1. Pooling resources through firms  
 
The simplest avenue for adopting some of the insights of the systems described in 
Part III is to reorganize the use of computation and communications systems within 
firms.  The personal computer revolution got a great lift when firms shifted from 
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mainframes to PC-based information systems.  Their use of PCs has remained unabated.  
The consequence is that any large firm has employees using large numbers of computers, 
usually all or mostly networked for purposes of information exchange, as well as backup 
from the personal units to a centralized backup facility.  Firms that have employees in 
more than one location, or that furnish or subsidize at least some of their employees’ 
home computers/laptops, handhelds, etc., can solve the cooperation problem trivially, by 
fiat.   
 
A storage system like OceanStore, a processing load-balancing utility like 
SETI@Home, or a campus-wide high speed data network like mesh networks could be 
implemented by a single firm if it has a sufficient number of employees, with a sufficient 
number of devices.  The more diverse the locations of the users, and the more diverse the 
devices on which the systems are implemented, the greater the internal survivability that 
the firm is able to capture.  A single firm implementing any such system need not face 
any of the motivation or coordination problems that may, or may not, create difficulties 
for the other alternative means of pooling these resources because of its ability to 
manage, rather than motivate and inform, action by independent agents. 
 
 One degree removed from within-firm cooperation can be platforms for pooling 
of firm resources.  Here, again, instead of efforts aimed at pooling individually-owned 
resources, mid-sized firms can decide to form alliances or networks of pooled resources.  
The transaction costs would, of course, be much higher than those of a single large firm, 
but still the number of independent decision makers who must reach agreement is 
smaller, per-computer, than fully decentralized systems.  One option for such a network 
to emerge would be through a market actor that would provide the technology and know-
how to pool resources, and would cut its own costs by using the physical facilities of the 
businesses it organizes.  The advantages that a cross-enterprise effort would have is in the 
relative diversity of its constituent components, which would give a successful cross-
enterprise implementation greater diversity and resistance to viruses and other system 
failures, in addition to intentional attacks, because of the diversity of systems involved 
relative to the system of a single large firm.   
 
 2. Secondary markets in excess capacity 
 
 As one moves away from enterprise-owned resources towards attempting to 
harness the excess capacity of individually-owned resources, the standard economists’ 
market-based response would take aim at pricing capacity.  This approach, despite its 
higher transaction costs and the possibility of lower participation than sharing-based 
systems, may nonetheless be the only approach available to certain types of enterprises.  
For example, a motivational message that sounded roughly like: “contribute a little bit of 
hard drive capacity to help assure that our bank records do not get deleted in the event of 
a terrorist attack on our main databanks” is not likely to have the same motivational 
effect as, say, “contribute your unused CPU cycles to help fight AIDS.”  While there may 
be some degree of goodwill towards helping prepare for terrorism, it is still likely that 
helping commercial entities will not easily harness social-psychological mechanisms.  
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This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to achieve similar results through 
markets.   
 
In the distributed computing world we have the examples for Gomez Performance 
Networks and Capacity Calibration Networks as enterprises that harness user capacity 
through a payment system.  Gomez Performance Network specializes in analyzing the 
actual speed and availability of corporate websites for access by users in different 
locations and with different connection speeds.  Gomez appears to use end-user installed 
clients not for their aggregate computational capacity but for their location in network 
topology and their connection speed.  They harness end users to run a client by promising 
payment based on a rate schedule per computation, per minute on the Net, and per-user 
referred.  But the users cannot set how often they participate or where they will go.  
Rather, the client, running testing tasks downloaded from the company’s site, checks the 
speed and availability of websites when accessed from the user’s desktop.  Payment is 
capped at $45 a month.  What is interesting about the site is that, while it uses the term 
“peer to peer” often, it constantly reinforces the message of “making money while you 
sleep”, a message particularly clear from the client interface, which constantly shows the 
user’s session, monthly, and lifetime balance of returns to running the program.  It is 
difficult to measure the comparative efficacy of this network’s use of money to the 
science-oriented volunteer distributed computation projects, however, because Gomez is 
not really harnessing raw distributed computation power, but rather the participants’ 
topological diversity.  It limits the number of users connected based on the information 
sought, not on raw processing capacity needed.  Therefore, neither the processing cycles 
harnessed nor the number of users recruited can offer a quantitative measure of 
comparative efficiency.  Capacity Calibration Network (CapCal), like Gomez, primarily 
harnesses the topological diversity and bandwidth of users, rather than their processing 
power.  It pays users $0.30 per hour that CapCal uses the client.  The user has no control 
over when the client is used.   
 
A number of regularities in these sites are useful to note.  First, all these payment-
based systems are sensitive to transaction costs, and use PayPal—a system designed 
specifically to be a cheap payment mechanism for micropayments on the Internet—to pay 
their participants.  Another characteristic shared by Gomez and CapCal is that they need 
topological diversity, and hence contributors are non-fungible to them.  It is insufficient 
for the purpose of these projects simply to harness as many users as possible.  They must 
harness only some users, and reject others, in order to create a good topological 
distribution of users.  The specificity of the requirements, which generates the need to 
reject many putative contributors, likely contributes to the difficulty of attracting 
volunteers.  Who, after all, wants to volunteer for a project that rejects many of its 
applicants for no apparent reason other than that they happen to be instrumentally 
useless?  This likely adds to the fact that the motivational call to “help organizations 
solve their business problems” does not sound quite as inspiring as “help fight AIDS”.  
Money then steps in as a reasonably well understood motivational source for a project ill-
suited to mobilize contributors socially.  Measuring the comparative efficiency of these 
projects to the non-market projects is difficult.  On the one hand, none of these systems 
has grown to a size that seriously competes with the volunteer projects as mechanisms for 
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mobilizing the vast untapped resources connected to the Internet.  On the other hand they 
have been in existence for a while, and do seem to generate the resources they need by 
paying for users’ excess capacity.   
 
A central design requirement for expanding the use of price mechanisms will be 
structuring the flow of funds so as to minimize the “crowding out” phenomenon.   One 
approach to solving this problem may be to build resource-harnessing strategies into pre-
existing consumer relations.  For example, one could imagine banks harnessing 
consumers who use online banking services as components in a financial data backup 
system.  One—simple but relatively weak— version would be to make a tamper-proof, 
time-stamped cached copy of the users’ own account information, that gets automatically 
updated whenever the user logs on.  Another would be to make a more explicit trade, 
where customers are given some discount in exchange for agreeing to offer backup 
facilities.  This would then require an architectural approach more similar to Freenet and 
OpenStore, to make sure that no participating customer could tamper with any document.  
The general point, however, is a simple one.  Organizations that have pre-existing 
relations with consumers, and can integrate the survivability-creating cooperation into 
their service, may have opportunities to harness distributed capacity through various add-
on or bonus features at rates that would not have drawn into a pool of resources users 
without a prior relationship.  Such low rates will, of course, be crucial given the amount 
of resources needed in relatively fine-grained quanta, can be paid to participants.    
 
3. Social production of survivable infrastructures 
 
  a. instrumental exchange and non-instrumental giving 
 
 Observation of social production systems suggests that they capture a wide range 
of phenomena, which draw on a wide range of motivations.  File-sharing systems, for 
example, are systems of instrumental reciprocity.  Participants do not explicitly barter 
with one another directly (I will give you these three popular songs in exchange for that 
rare live recording), but rather enter a vast transactional framework where they provide 
their own songs to some unspecified number and identity of users, in exchange for access 
to the songs stored on the hard drives of other unspecified and anonymous or 
pseudonymous others.  An application like Skype—the voice over Internet application 
provided by the makers of KaZaa that offers fully end-to-end encrypted telephony service 
from PC to PC with no dedicated infrastructure, using the FastTrack architecture—
similarly seems most readily explained as an instrumental exchange system.   Users who 
wish to have the benefits of using Skype and being available so that their friends can call 
them will keep their applications running.  Whenever they are not themselves speaking, 
the computer on which they run the application ready to receive calls is also available to 
relay the calls of others or to provide SuperNode functionality.  Although there are no test 
reports on the quality of Skype, anecdotally the application delivers quite impressive 
quality of service despite its lack of dedicated infrastructure, and its reliance purely on 
peer-to-peer provisioned excess bandwidth, processing, and storage. 
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Distributed computing systems, on the other hand, are not helpfully described as 
exchange relationships.  The users do not have either direct or possible downstream 
access to resources or products they need.  The contribution must be explained in terms 
other than reciprocal instrumentalism.  Observation of the practices and interfaces of 
these systems suggests that they mix-and-match a variety of assumptions about the nature 
of the social giving that they pool.  Sites describe the scientific purpose of the models and 
the specific scientific output, including posting articles that have used the calculations, as 
well as, in some cases, offering interfaces that allow—with greater or lesser degrees of 
legibility—contributors to see the scientific contribution their computation is making.25  
In these components, the project organizers seem to assume some degree of taste for 
generalized altruism and the pursuit of meaning in contributing to a common goal.  They 
also implement a variety of mechanisms to reinforce the sense of purpose, so there are 
aggregate statistics about total computations performed—again, indicating a sense that 
users want to belong to a project that is successful and larger than themselves.  Alongside 
these more solidaristic practices, the sites run components that are much more indicative 
of the mainstream anthropology of gift literature interpretation of giving as agonistic, on 
a “Big Man” model, that is, as a form of expressing social position.  Here, we see most 
sites not only allowing individuals to track their own contributions, but also providing 
“user of the month” type rankings—displaying who contributed the most cycles and 
similar statistics.  Nonetheless, in an informal survey that SETI@Home conducts among 
its own users, only a little more than 5% focused on answers that tended to suggest a 
search for fame or explicit recognition, like getting one’s name on the top 100 list of the 
site.  The majority of users self-describe as contributing “for the good of humanity” 
(58%) or simply to keep their computer productive (17%).26  Another interesting feature 
of these sites, which pool capacity from a range of the most advanced economies around 
the globe, is the appeal to ready-made identities, encouraging users to compete not as 
individuals, but as teams sharing national or ethnic bonds, (e.g., Overclockers Australia 
or Alliance Francophone), technical minority status (e.g., Linux or MacAddict4Life), or 
organizational affiliation (University of Tennessee or of Alabama).   
 
 b.  Policy and design issues for harnessing instrumental exchange 
 
 These observations suggest that the organizers of distributed computing systems 
do not themselves have a clear model of why it is that some or most of their contributors 
contribute.  Nor do we have empirical or theoretical basis to state whether different 
modalities of motivating social sharing and exchange crowd each other out, so that 
implementing one approach (e.g., user of the month) would have a similar crowding out 
effect of introducing money relative to other, less individually-oriented or agonistic forms 
of social motivations—like “help find a cure for AIDS”.  The little we have to go on 
suggests that the most successful projects have indeed been using mixed strategies.  The 
applicability of crowding out theory to different social motivational structures would 
seem to be a fruitful and important focus of future research.   
                                                 
25 Climateprediction.net in particular provides each user with a discrete run of a simulated world with 
certain assumptions about CO2 levels, which shows the user how his/her “world” is doing relative to a 
baseline run. 
26 http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/polls.html. 
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 As a practical matter, ad hoc mesh networks to provide survivable last/first mile 
connectivity are readily obtainable on an instrumental exchange model, and can most 
readily be achieved or seeded by specific policy moves.  Adoption of WiFi for in-home 
or office wireless LANs, on the one hand, and the emergence of WiFi-based protocols for 
making transceivers self-organize into ad hoc mesh networks that use autonomic 
formation and self-heal provide the building blocks of such a system.  The primary 
remaining stumbling block to simple market-based emergence of neighborhood-level and 
municipal last mile redundant wireless transport networks is the timing of reaching a 
critical density of adoption of these devices and networking protocols in any given area.  
Once devices are deployed in geographic space with sufficient density, the advantages of 
buying a device and implementing a mesh networking protocol as a means of reaching a 
competitive broadband Internet Point of Presence that can circumvent the wired pipelines 
to the home or small office will be available to any individual making an individual 
decision about purchasing a device with a networking capability installed.  Until that 
density of deployment is reached, however, the added cost, whatever it may be, of adding 
mesh networking capability, will do the individual no good because she cannot rely on 
there being a sufficient number of others to allow her to reach the neighbor she wants, the 
local public library on a municipal WAN, or, most importantly, the competitive 
broadband POP that could save her $10 a month on her broadband access fee.  Because 
of the path of development of WiFi, this problem may eventually solve itself, because 
users are deploying WiFi networking devices for their own home networking needs.  
Nonetheless, the move to implement wider-range networking may be delayed, or even 
stalled, by a lack of sufficient adoption of networking capabilities. 
 
 There are two distinct types of interventions that different levels of government 
can make that would speed up adoption and solve the problem of threshold density.  Each 
could work independently of the other, but they would be mutually reinforcing.   
 
At the federal level, the FCC could orient its unlicensed devices spectrum use 
rules with an eye to making mesh networking simpler.  One type of intervention would be 
to provide greater flexibility in the limitations on the design of unlicensed devices.  
Currently, constraints on unlicensed devices are defined in terms of a maximum peak 
power spectral density permitted for each device.  What that means, as a practical matter, 
is that whether a device is deployed in Manhattan or in a ranch in Montana, it may only 
transmit a certain level of energy in a given bandwidth—which in turn limits the distance 
that a signal can travel.  In Manhattan, the limitation is plausibly related to preventing 
interference with other nearby devices, and given the density of neighbors, may impose 
no functional constraint on the ability of one transceiver to reach the neighbors it needs to 
form a mesh.  In Montana, on the other hand, the device could be cranked up to much 
higher power without interfering with any neighbors, and if it is not cranked up, will fail 
to reach the next door neighbor in the mesh.  While implementing a “fix” for this 
problem is far from trivial, the basic idea of in situ measurement proposed by the FCC’s 
own Spectrum Taskforce (SPTF) Report may provide the correct way of thinking about a 
more locally-adaptable regulatory requirement.27  While the specific implementation in 
                                                 
27 Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Taskforce Report 25-33 (Nov. 2002). 
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that report—the “interference temperature” model—may or may not work, the basic 
insight that devices that are context aware and can measure whether they are in an 
energy-soaked or energy-sparse environment should be permitted to adjust their transmit 
power accordingly is promising.   
 
The second type of FCC intervention is more of a “carrot” than regulatory relief, 
and was also suggested by the SPTF Report.  Here the idea is that device manufacturers 
get the “carrot” of being permitted to operate their devices in public safety spectrum, as 
well as in the general unlicensed spectrum, in exchange for designing their devices to be 
aware and compliant with the highly bursty pattern of public safety use.  The basic model 
is a “lights and sirens” model, where the highway is used by all vehicles, rather than 
having a reserved fire lane or emergency vehicle lane, but all drivers know they must pull 
over when an ambulance, fire truck, or police car are flashing their lights and sounding 
their sirens.  Device manufacturers who build devices that will recognize a siren and shift 
the device from normal user mode to an “infrastructure only” mode available to help in 
public safety communications but not using those frequencies for the users’ own 
communications will be able to take advantage of wider and lower frequencies most of 
the time—improving their performance relative to competitors who do not take 
advantage of the same framework.   
 
At the state and even more so the local level, government agencies can help to 
seed mesh networks by adopting the kinds of public safety systems described in Part III, 
and, importantly, making those facilities available to non-public safety users under non-
emergency conditions.  The idea parallels the public safety spectrum use described in the 
preceding paragraph, but implemented using resources under the control of local and 
state governments—fixed-infrastructure points on fire houses, police stations, public 
libraries, schools, or utility poles to provide threshold density—not by changing the 
operating parameters of the equipment, but by locating a larger number of off-the-shelf 
devices that are mesh enabled throughout their communities.  This would increase the 
probability for any given individual that he will be able to connect to a network if he buys 
a device, even without coordinating with anyone else.  The sirens and lights effect would 
then have to be implemented in the network access protocol, rather than in the end user 
device, but since the mesh architecture is now becoming separate from the off-the-shelf 
device, and since the local government will be the primary purchaser of the mesh 
protocol, it would be possible to specify respect for sirens in that protocol instead of in 
the device itself.   
 
 Implementing a parallel policy intervention for distributed storage and retrieval 
systems will likely be much more controversial.  As the opening paragraph of this paper 
suggested, we already have a highly survivable storage and retrieval system in the shape 
of peer-to-peer file sharing networks.  We have working distributed storage systems like 
Freenet, and working models like OceanStore, that are already available as models to 
achieve highly distributed, redundant, survivable storage and retrieval systems.   Because 
of the powerful lobby of Hollywood and the recording industry, however, peer-to-peer 
systems are under tremendous pressure, and deploying such systems presents a 
substantial business risk.  While some of the most recent decisions, particularly in the 
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Grokster case, suggest that systems with diverse uses may enjoy the benefit of the Sony 
case’s privilege for manufacturers of devices/systems that have noninfringing, as well as 
infringing uses, the fate of Napster and Aimster must weigh heavily on any U.S. domestic 
firm, that is a stable and reachable defendant, and that intends to offer a distributed 
storage and retrieval system.  As Larry Lessig put it so well in Free Culture, however, the 
theoretical availability of various defenses, like fair use, may be enough for lawyers to 
claim that a law is “balanced;”  it does not, however actually provide a comfort zone for 
businesses given the realities of liability insurance and litigation risk.28  In order to 
overcome this risk, one would need to amend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to 
make explicit a safe harbor for distributed storage and retrieval systems that have non-
infringing uses.   
 
 The primary question with respect to using approaches oriented toward 
instrumental social exchange in the context of storage and retrieval would be the extent to 
which one could structure the network so that its benefits were globally reciprocal.  
Consider OceanStore.  Its designer, concerned with designing the technical attributes of 
the system, as opposed to its social design, simply assumed that the capacity will be 
harnessed and distributed through some price mechanism.29  This assumption was not, 
however, necessary to the design.  One could instead design the system such that it is 
available as a back up system for all of its contributors on a reciprocal basis.  In that form 
of system, the reason I would contribute my hard drive to the system would be that I 
could then use it for my own data backup.  If I want to use the system, I must contribute 
some capacity of my hard drive.  The potential problem of free riding could be solved by 
tying the amount of resources that the system uses on one’s own machine to the amount 
of storage that the user requires of the system, harnessing some ratio greater than 1 of the 
resources of the user relative to the resources the user uses.   
 
This problem of how to resolve free riding in peer-to-peer file sharing networks 
arose first in a critique of the Gnutella network.  Adar and Huberman showed that the 
distribution of files shared was highly skew—that 70% of Gnutella users did not share 
their own files, and that over 50% of the files shared came from the top 1% of nodes.30  
There was one interesting theoretical response, and one valuable set of practical 
responses to this concern.  The theoretical response was Clay Shirky’s.31  Shirky focused 
on the nonrivalry of music files, the renewability of bandwidth, and the high costs of 
micropayment systems—like Mojo Nation—that might replace social sharing.    His 
basic point was that systems that share nonrival or perfectly renewable resources can 
withstand a large degree of free riding, because the free riders, while not contributing to 
the quality of the enterprise, take relatively little from it.  The practical reality is that (a) 
efforts like Mojo Nation, which attempted to formalize the barter system in file sharing 
by giving anyone who gave resources “Mojo”–system-specific money that could be used 
                                                 
28 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 97-99 (2004). 
29 Rhea et. al., Ocean Store supra, note 8, at 41. 
30 Eytan Adar and Bernard Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, First Monday, (October 2000) available 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.html 
31 Clay Shirky, In Praise of Free-Loading, OReilly Open P2P, 12/01/2000, available 
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/12/01/shirky_freeloading.html 
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to “purchase” system resources—failed; and (b) clients of the Gnutella and later 
FastTrack systems—like Limewire, BearShare, and later KaZaa, implemented much 
coarser mechanisms to improve the performance of a user’s system, depending on the 
extent to which the user contributed resources for the benefit of the system as a whole.   
 
KaZaa, for example, has created a system that motivates its users to (a) share 
more content; and (b) review the quality of the files they share so that they have both 
technical and content integrity.32  The system assigns to each user a “participation level” 
that is coarsely defined as low, medium, or high.  A user begins with a level of medium.  
A user who systematically downloads more megabytes than he or she allows others to 
download, or whose files are often corrupt or incomplete, will eventually be downgraded 
to “low.”  Users whose files are downloaded more often than they download other users’ 
files, and/or who assure that the files they make available have high technical and content 
integrity, are upgraded to high participation level.  Participation level is translated into a 
somewhat improved search capacity.  In order not to put new users at too great a 
disadvantage, the system does not use participation level to affect initial search results.  
But the system offers “deeper” searches under a “search more” function, and the 
availability of the “search more” function is coarsely rationed based on the user’s 
participation level ranking.   
 
Without suggesting that KaZaa’s solution is the only or best way of achieving 
ideal levels of participation in peer-based survivable storage and retrieval systems, it does 
offer the flavor of the design solution.  If one is designing a system like OceanStore, and 
one is concerned about improving participation levels, one could (a) make the system 
available for its users to store and back up their own data—and as unique files like digital 
photographs that users would want to store and view from anywhere, and whose loss 
would be irretrievable increase, this function will become ever more valuable; and (b) tie 
the availability of system resources to the degree of contribution that each participant 
makes.  The latter component should not, however, consistent with the claims about the 
relative transaction costs advantages of social exchange systems relative to market 
exchange systems, and the potential crowding out effect, seek to provide too fine an 
accounting system.  Relatively coarse measures of participation seem to comport more 
with the relatively informal ways in which social sharing and exchange systems often 
work, and certainly have been the more successful approach in the peer-to-peer file 
sharing space.   
 
  c. Non-instrumental sharing and giving 
 
 The description of the motivational structure of distributed computing projects 
suggests that these represent the least studied and understood set of social production—
that is, non-price, non-enterprise/firm based activities.  They seem to be instances of 
cooperation that are not exchange systems, but rather operate on a model of pure 
redistribution with no exchange expected.33  At most, if they do involve exchange, they 
                                                 
32 http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/participation_ratio.htm. 
33 See, e.g., James Woodburn, Sharing is Not A Form of Exchange, in Property Relations (C. Hahn, ed. 
1998) at 48-63. 
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are not a form of coarsely-accounted in-kind barter, but are rather a form of producing 
social relations and social hierarchy, or some other symbolic meaning.  This latter form 
has been the dominant focus of the anthropology of gift literature.34   
 
 The practices of the distributed computing models outline the elements that would 
be available either to individuals or organizations seeking to harness excess capacity for 
computation, communications, and storage in ways that were not easily attainable 
through instrumental exchange systems.  To generate the signaling effects associated with 
public giving one would have to assure that individuals can track their own contributions 
and that there would be a facility to identify and recognize high contributors.  To provide 
the context for social connections, communications systems like discussion boards for 
participants could be maintained, so as to produce activity-based social interaction.  In 
the alternative, one could attempt to harness pre-existing identity categories, such as 
nationality, or university or other organizational identity, by fostering extramural 
competition, as SETI@Home and Folding@Home do in reliance on national and other 
affiliation identities.   
 
These are approaches familiar from the philanthropy world, and to a great extent 
this aspect of sharing systems is parallel to the phenomenon of in-kind giving.  Systems 
like distributed computing have the advantage, however, that they are harnessing 
privately owned resources in ways that make it unusually “cheap” for the donor to give. 
First, because things are less fungible than money, the opportunity cost of giving a thing 
is lower than the opportunity cost of giving money.  Giving up $600 in cash imposes a 
higher opportunity cost on the donor than donating $600-worth of an old computer, 
because the mechanisms for liquidating those $600 and reusing them for some other 
activity are more costly than they are to do so with the retained cash.  Second, as long as 
the systems are tailored to harness genuinely excess resources—like computation, or 
bandwidth, or storage that is genuinely renewable or non-scarce—the “contribution” 
given by the individual is costless to the individual.  The only “costs” are (a) the forgone 
market opportunity; and (b) the transaction costs of participation in the social giving 
system.  Because of the relative advantage of social production systems in terms of 
marginal transaction costs, secondary markets may not be a feasible alternative for 
widely distributed excess capacity.  Because the resources at stake—electrons and 
photons in one form or another—flow easily over a network in ways that need not be 
transparent to the contributor, the decision and implementation costs are lower than, say, 
donating a physical computer to a school.  A system that reduces participation costs 
sufficiently should be able to motivate participation as long as it provides any meaningful 
social-psychological rewards.   
 
 
                                                 
34 The anthropological literature on sharing and the gift has been vast, starting with Bronislaw 
Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) and Marcel Mauss, The gift; forms and functions of 
exchange in archaic societies (1925) (trans. 1954).  A combination of a broad intellectual history and a 
major contemporary contribution to this line is Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift (1997); see also 
James G. Carrier, Property and Social Relations in Melanesian Anthropology, in Property Relations, 
Renewing the Anthropological Tradition, C. M. Hann, ed. (1998) at 85-103 (providing brief intellectual 
history of the literature); C.M. Hann, Introduction, in Hann, supra, note 2, at 23-34 (same).   
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 In an open network whose value inheres in global connectivity, achieving security 
through impregnability is difficult.  For large classes of system requirements, 
survivability is more important than impregnability.  In particular, where the value of a 
system—what makes it a critical system—is its availability for reliable use by its 
intended users in the face of attack, failure, or accident, rather than its denial to an enemy 
or competitor, survivability, not impregnability, is the primary security desideratum of a 
system.   
 
 Since the early 1960s, and consistent with the design of the Internet itself, 
survivability has been understood to require distributed resources and redundant capacity, 
organized so that the system can learn of failures and self-heal by reconfiguring its 
redundant resources to provide the functionalities threatened by the attack or failure.  The 
greater the degree of distribution or diversity in the loci and types of sources of capacity, 
the greater the resilience of the system to an attack on any particular resource or class of 
resources.   
 
 In the past half decade to a decade a series of developments in distributed 
computing, ad hoc mesh networking, and peer-to-peer file sharing systems have outlined 
an approach towards replicating the survivability characteristics of the Internet as a data 
transmission network with regard to the three central attributes of any computation and 
communications system: basic physical-layer local connectivity (through wireless); data 
storage and retrieval (p2p); and processing (distributed computing).  These systems all 
rely on pooling of individually owned private computation and communications 
resources—PCs and laptops—into networks that share the excess capacity—processing, 
storage, and bandwidth—productively.  They provide us with a template for how we 
could deploy similar strategies to develop peer-based survivable infrastructures for the 
core requirements of a computation and communications-dependant economy and 
society. 
 
 These systems are instances of the general category of social production, or 
sharing and exchange of shareable goods.  These are goods whose technical 
characteristics make it highly likely that there will be a relatively large amount of excess 
capacity distributed in a society, distributed in relatively small dollops owned by 
individuals.  Under these conditions, the transaction costs associated with harnessing the 
excess capacity of these resources through a secondary market are likely high, and the 
crowding out effect of trying to do so through markets, are likely to decrease, rather than 
increase, total activity, because they will likely drive off more social contributors than 
they will lure in market vendors of excess capacity.  Resources distributed in this 
particular pattern may instead be more amenable to being harnessed through social 
production systems, rather than through price-based markets and firms.  The paper 
concludes by offering a variety of specific policy and organizational actions that could be 
used to improve the degree to which we harness these excess resources towards providing 
our society with redundant, survivable backup communication and computation systems.   
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While my focus here has been on computation and communications, nothing in 
the analysis limits my observations to these resources alone.  Any type of capital good or 
source of capacity that is sufficiently fine-grained to be widely owned in society, yet 
sufficiently coarse-grained or lumpy so that it usually has more capacity than its owner 
can use is a candidate for mobilization through such social production systems.  Learning 
how to build sharing systems, rather than focusing purely on ways to perfect price-based 
markets in capacity or other types of goods, and focusing instead on facilitating the 
conditions of social sharing and exchange, could yield greater improvements in 
productivity, and in the case of goods that can be harnessed towards providing survivable 
critical infrastructures, security.   
